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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo, apply-
ing the same legal standard used by the district court. Wolf v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995). Summary
judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affida-
vits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Whether the PCB-impregnated soil at Appellee's Fort Union
manufacturing facility constitutes a point source under 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14).
II. Whether Appellee's discharge of PCBs into the Bearclaw
River in violation of the State of New Union's water quality
standards are actionable under the Clean Water Act.
III. Whether the Clean Water Act preempts the federal common
law of nuisance.
IV. Whether the Clean Water Act preempts state common law of
nuisance for non-point source pollution originating in another
state.
V. Whether Appellant Bearclaw River Keepers may maintain a
public nuisance claim on behalf of its members under the
"special injury" rule.
VI. Whether Appellants have claims for reimbursement and sum-
mary judgment against Appellee under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) or
42 U.S.C. § 9607.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Bearclaw River Keeper, Inc. ("BRK") brought suit under the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 ("CWA" or "the Act") on
behalf of its members against Major Electronics, ("Appellee") al-
leging CWA violations arising from the discharge of
Polychlorinated Biphenyls ("PCBs") into the Bearclaw River from
its facility in Fort Union, State of Progress. (Record "R." at 3.)
The town of Noblesville, New Union, filed a permissive interven-
tion, joins BRK, and adds a claim for reimbursement of response
costs under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 of the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). (R.
at 3.)
The trial court held for Appellee on all issues. First, the court
ruled that the soil underneath the Fort Union facility is not a stat-
utory point source. (R. at 6.) Second, the court ruled that viola-
tion of water quality standards was not properly before the court.
(R. at 7.) Third, the court ruled that the Act completely preempts
the common law of nuisance. (R. at 8.) Last, the court ruled that
Noblesville may not claim reimbursement. (R. at 9.)
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Intervenor, the Town of Noblesville, is a municipality located
on the Bearclaw River in the State of New Union downstream
from the state's border with the State of Progress. (R. at 4.) Ap-
pellant, BRK, is a not-for-profit corporation organized under the
laws of New Union. (R. at 4.) Major Electronics ("Appellee") has
for decades operated an electronics manufacturing facility on the
shore of the Bearclaw River in Fort Union, State of Progress. (R.
at 4.)
Appellee has a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem ("NPDES") permit issued under 33 U.S.C. § 1342 by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), which allows it to discharge
treated effluent into the Bearclaw River. (R. at 4.) Neither Appel-
lee's initial nor renewed permits contained a PCB effluent limita-
tion. (R. at 4.) Appellee's effluent occasionally contained low
levels of PCBs, although Appellee stopped their use entirely in
1980. (R. at 4.) The State of Progress classified the stretch of
river adjacent to Fort Union as a "Class C" water, in which it im-
poses no regulations on the discharge of PCBs. (R. at 4.)
Spills and leaks at Appellee's facility have impregnated the
soil beneath the Fort Union facility with PCBs, which leach into
638 [Vol. 23
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the Bearclaw River. (R. at 4.) These pollutants have migrated
down the river to the Noblesville public beach, where they have
impregnated the soil on the banks, the public beach, and the sedi-
ment in the river itself. (R. at 4.) As a result, fish taken at loca-
tions on or near the swimming beach contain levels of PCBs that
exceed safety levels established by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion ("FDA"). (R. at 5.) PCB levels at the public beach also render
the river unsafe for contact recreational use. (R. at 5.)
The State of New Union has classified the stretch of the Bear-
claw adjacent to Noblesville as a "Class B" water, with water qual-
ity standards that limit PCBs to a level appropriate for contract
recreational and fishing uses. (R. at 5.) On average, Noblesville's
population is just above the poverty level. (R. at 5.) Because of
this, many residents rely on the Bearclaw River, and particularly
on locations near the beach, for sustenance fishing. (R. at 5.) Ad-
ditionally, Noblesville lacks a municipal pool and many residents
rely on the beach for recreation. (R. at 5.)
Noblesville has taken efforts to warn citizens about the dan-
ger posed by pollution at the public beach, including erecting a
chain link fence and increasing policing of the area (at a cost of
$50,000). (R. at 5.) Local swimming and fishing in the river have
decreased by thirty and twenty-five percent, respectively. (R. at
5.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. PCBs at Appellee's Fort Union Facility Do Not
Arise From a Point Source.
The text of the Act indicates Congress did not intend ordinary
soil to be a point source. Instead, ordinary soil is more akin to
non-point source pollution. Even broadly defined, a point source
implies affirmative conduct by dischargers to channel pollution,
which is absent here.
I. A Citizen Suit Is Warranted in the Present
Circumstance.
The structure, legislative history and overall purpose of the
CWA all support use of the Act's citizen suit provision to directly
address violations of state water quality control standards. Fur-
ther, the distressed state of the nation's waters and flaccid govern-
2006] 639
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ment enforcement strongly favor allowing citizen enforcement of
non-point source pollution standards.
III. The Common Law of Nuisance Is Properly
Applied to the Present Circumstance.
The federal common law of nuisance was employed by the
courts to resolve transboundary pollution before the modern CWA
was passed. Cases since that time have only addressed issues of
point source pollution. Because the instant dispute involves only
a non-point source, federal common law is not preempted. The
need for a uniform national standard to limit pollution from non-
point sources, the conflict between the stated goals of the Act and
the lack of adequate self-regulation by the State of Progress, and
the inadequacy of other legal remedies available to New Union
support its application. If the court instead applies state common
law of nuisance, the same considerations urge application of New
Union law.
IV. BRK May Not Maintain a Public Nuisance Action
Under the Special Injury Rule
Under the special injury rule, a private party may not main-
tain a public nuisance action in the absence of an injury that dif-
fers in kind from the injury suffered by the general public. Here,
BRK's members have suffered the same kind of injury suffered by
the community of Noblesville as a whole, the curtailment of recre-
ation and fishing activities. Although the severity of the injury
may differ, the nature of the injury is the same. Thus Noblesville,
as the local government authority, is the proper party to bring a
public nuisance action on behalf of its constituents.
V. BRK and Noblesville May Maintain Claims Under
CERCLA § 107.
Although BRK and Noblesville appear to be precluded from
bringing a claim for contribution under § 113(f) in the absence of a
previous or pending action under §§ 106 or 107, both have actiona-
ble claims for the recovery of response costs under § 107. Even if
Noblesville were somehow classified as a liable party under § 107,
it would still have a claim under that section under the implied
right to contribution. Additionally, BRK's § 107 claim was im-
properly denied at the liability stage for alleged inconsistency
with the National Contingency Plan.
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ARGUMENT
I. ORDINARY SOIL IS NOT A POINT SOURCE.
The lower court correctly held that Appellee did not violate
the prohibition contained in the CWA, barring discharge of any
pollutant without a permit issued under the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES"). 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311,
1342 (2005). The Act makes unlawful "any addition of any pollu-
tant to navigable waters from any point source." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12)(A) (2005). The jurisdiction of the Act depends on the
meaning of "point source," defined as "any discernable, confined
and discrete conveyance." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
CWA point source provisions do not govern pollutants in soil
beneath Appellee's facility because "point source" does not include
ordinary soil. First, the plain text of the Act indicates that Con-
gress did not intend point source provisions to include ordinary
soil. Second, pollutants in ordinary soil fall under the non-point
source pollution control regime. Lastly, even where courts have
broadly interpreted "point source," some conduct by dischargers to
channel pollutants is always implicated, even if only to invite for-
mation of conveyance by a natural force.
A. Congress Did Not Intend Ordinary Soil to be a Point
Source.
While "point source" has been construed liberally, see, e.g.,
Beartooth Alliance v. Crow Butte Mines, 904 F.Supp. 1168, 1173
(D.Mont. 1995), the supposed "plain purpose" of a statute cannot
be invoked at the expense of specific terms, Am. Min. Congress v.
EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1185 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Doing so ignores
the significance of compromise in the legislative process and "pre-
vents the effectuation of congressional intent." Bd. of Governors of
Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373-74
(1986). Instead, "[tihe question... is not what a court thinks is
generally appropriate to the regulatory process, it is what Con-
gress intended." E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430
U.S. 112, 138 (1977).
6412006]
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1. The text of the Act refutes ordinary soil as a point
source.
The chief canon of statutory interpretation declares "judicial
inquiry ... complete" when a statute's words are unambiguous.
Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992).
a. Words chosen by Congress to define "point
source" do not manifest intent to encompass
ordinary soil.
Ordinary soil is not enumerated as a "point source." 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14). While the definition of "point source" is not ex-
clusive, words used to define the term ("discernable, confined")
and examples given ("pipe, ditch") "evoke images of physical struc-
tures . . .that systematically act as a means of conveying pollu-
tants from an industrial source to navigable waterways." Id.; U.S.
v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 646 (2d Cir. 1993). In
South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004), the Court contained its point source
analysis to a pump moving pollutants from a canal to a wetland;
the underlying permeable soil through which pollutants migrated
was not deemed a point source.
Furthermore, it is "elemental that Congress does not add un-
necessary words to a statute." Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d at
646. The detailed statutory description of "point source" would be
unnecessary and misleading if Congress anticipated inclusion of
broad expanses of soil. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). Had Congress in-
tended the CWA to regulate pollutants moving through soil, it
could have forgone terms connoting a distinct, controlled conduit,
including "confined" and "discrete," and embraced a more inexact
definition for broader application. Id.
b. Textual emphasis on industrial sources
reflects regulatory realities, not the intent
to designate all sources of pollution as
point sources.
Congress considered industrial dischargers a prime target for
the CWA. That view finds textual support in the volume and po-
tency of CWA provisions devoted to industrial sources. U.S. v. W.
Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 308 (V.I. 1997). As imple-
mented, the emphasis is corroborated by subjection of Appellee's
facility to NPDES permit requirements. However, the CWA does
642 [Vol. 23
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not impose strict liability for pollutants traced to an industrial site
and the statute's emphasis on such sources does not tacitly imply
its terms be construed to achieve that end.
Instead, Congress' focus on industrial sources reflects identifi-
cation of a "sensible" target for regulation. Plaza Health Labs.,
Inc., 3 F.3d at 646. Because industrial loadings typically "emerge
from a discrete point such as the end of a pipe," they are well-
suited for permit-based regulation. Id. Such loads are presump-
tively easier to isolate, quantify and control. Id.
Here, Appellants do not allege that pollutants are conveyed
by such a discrete apparatus, only by ordinary soil. Unlike a
"pipe," ordinary soil is diffuse by nature and does not facilitate
quantification or control of migrating pollutants. Thus, Congress'
focus on industrial facilities cannot sustain a torturously broad
application of the CWA and render impotent all limits written by
Congress for the term "point source." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). It is
oft-claimed that "Congress would have regulated non-point pollu-
tion if a workable method could have been derived." U.S. v. Earth
Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 372 (10th Cir. 1979). Limiting NPDES
permits to point sources in spite of this predilection to regulate
more broadly confirms that Congress purposely passed on moni-
toring an outlet as inexact as ordinary soil through point source
regulation.
2. Congress intended pollution in ordinary soil to be
addressed by non-point source pollution
solutions.
Congress recognized that the NPDES program could not ad-
dress all pollution reaching navigable waters. See Earth Scis.,
Inc., 599 F.2d 368; see also Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980). Non-point source pollution is comprised of
sources ill-suited to permit controls. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1329. Al-
though not defined in statute, non-point source pollution is often
associated with a rainfall or snowmelt event and includes runoff
from fields and construction operations. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (ex-
empting agricultural storm water discharges and return flows
from irrigated agriculture from the term "point source"); see Earth
Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368; see also Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41.
Association with a discrete conveyance is what distinguishes a
point source from non-point source. Friends of Santa Fe County v.
LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F.Supp. 1333, 1358 (D.N.M. 1995) (non-
point source "as any source of water pollution or pollutants not
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associated with a discrete conveyance"); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v.
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 166 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Here, the pollu-
tion complained of is not associated with such a conveyance. It is,
however, coupled with rainfall, a typical trigger of non-point
source pollution. Friends of Santa Fe County. 892 F.Supp. at
1358-59. Therefore, Congress intended pollution moving through
ordinary soil to be addressed not as a point source but as non-
point source pollution.
3. Ordinary soil as a point source frustrates
legislative policy decisions as it radically
expands federal enforcement power at the
expense of the states.
Congress chose to tackle point and non-point source pollution
in conspicuously different ways. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1329, 1342.
Construing ordinary soil as a point source dismantles the struc-
tural and regulatory dichotomy envisioned by Congress and im-
plemented by the Act.
Also, ordinary soil as a point source drastically extends fed-
eral permitting power. In nearly every storm water event, rain-
water might conceivably saturate contaminated soil causing
leachate to pollute a navigable water in the manner alleged here.
Subsuming rain-related discharge under the point source um-
brella implicates serious federalism issues by emasculating the
CWA delegation of power to states as chief regulators of non-point
source pollution.
B. Ordinary Soil is Not Altered by the Hand of Man and
So Is Not a Point Source.
Even where courts have interpreted the term "point source"
broadly, courts have declined to characterize an unconfined, unal-
tered expanse of ordinary soil as a "point source." See, e.g., Sierra
Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1141 n.4 (10th
Cir. 2005) ("[S]eepage that travels through fractured rock would
be non-point source pollution").
1. Absence of purposeful human action to channel
indicates that ordinary soil is not a point
source.
Courts, including the lower court, have distinguished cases on
the basis of some conduct by polluters to channel or guide pollu-
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tion into a navigable water. In Avoyelles Sportsmen's League Inc.
v. Marsh, the court found the defendant's bulldozers and backhoes
created the channeling effect necessary to make the machinery it-
self a point source. 715 F.2d 897, 927 (5th Cir. 1983). In Abston
Construction Company, mine operators who designed spoil piles in
such a way as to affect drainage were liable as point source dis-
charge violators under the CWA. 620 F2d at 52. Importantly, the
court also recognized that natural rainfall drainage fell outside
the purview of the Act. Id. Here, Appellee took no affirmative ac-
tion to pile soil or otherwise channel leachate into the Bearclaw
River. Appellants only allege that natural rainfall drainage
through Appellee's soil implicates point source discharge liability
and so cannot prevail.
2. Absence of inadvertent human action to channel
indicates that ordinary soil is not a point
source.
Liability for discharge without a permit does not require that
a discharger act with the intent to channel polluted storm water
into a navigable water. See Earth Scis., 599 F.2d at 374. The defi-
nition of "point source" encompasses human conduct that only
passively invites formation of conveyance by a natural force. See
id. In Earth Sciences, the defendant's mining operation collected
snowmelt and rainfall in a gold-extraction process. Id. From a
lack of foresight or precaution, the limited capacity of the drainage
system failed to contain overabundant wastewater and resulted in
the discharge of toxic overspill. Earth Scis., 599 F.2d at 374. The
court found defendant's entire operation a point source in viola-
tion of the CWA. Id.
Interestingly, the court does not address the physical discon-
nect between the point source and the navigable water at issue in
that case. This disconnect seems to run afoul of the CWA require-
ment that the pollutant enter the navigable water by an addition
from a point source. 33 U.S.C. § 1362. This omission suggests one
of two things. First, it indicates that the court did not intend for
the channeling of wastewater over or through soil to be a point
source and overlooked the requisite physical nexus between the
point source and the navigable water. This conclusion supports
the view that ordinary soil is not a point source because the point
source designation is limited to the boundaries of the facility and
does not include soil. Earth Scis., 599 F.2d at 374.
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The alternative rationale is that the court broadly defined
point source to include the naturally-occurring runoff rivulets
flowing through and over the soil without expressly saying so.
While seeming to support ordinary soil as a point source, Earth
Sciences is distinguishable because there, defendants created the
conditions that allowed polluted rivulets to form. Id. The drain-
age system in Earth Sciences was constructed to prevent escape of
cyanide-tainted wastewater and failed to do so. Id. Here, PCBs
are not part of Appellee's normal wastewater discharge and PCB
contamination under Appellee's facility is not due to failure of a
wastewater discharge system. Furthermore, Appellee has not
otherwise acted to encourage conveyance of PCBs through the soil.
The soil beneath Appellee's facility is unaltered.
Instead, the physical state of the soil beneath Appellee's facil-
ity is more akin to the land at issue in Sierra Club v. Martin. 71
F.Supp.2d 1268, 1305-1306 (N.D. Ga. 1996). In Martin, plaintiffs
argued that development on defendant's land would cause ditches
to form and result in a channeling of pollutants in violation of the
Act. Id. at 1306. The Court conceded that naturally-occurring
ditches could turn diffuse storm water into a point source. Id.
However, because the soil was to date unaltered, the Court re-
fused to confer point source discharge liability. Martin, 71
F.Supp.2d at 1306. Similarly here, pollutants did not move
through ditches or conveyance of any kind. PCBs were affected
only by filtration properties of ordinary soil including permeabil-
ity and surface pressure. Thus, ordinary soil is not a point source.
3. Seepages lack the qualities of a point source.
The issue of water seeping through soil to arrive at a naviga-
ble water is addressed in Friends of Santa Fe County, 892 F.Supp.
1333. There, the defendants operated an overburden pile and
remediation system contaminated by acid mine drainage ("AMD").
Id. at 1337. Plaintiffs claimed that the operation itself and seep-
age carrying trace pollutants through soil to a nearby arroyo were
a point source. Id. at 1359. While the court found the pile and
remediation systems would "readily constitute" point sources, the
seepages formed in ordinary soil through which polluted water
moved did not. Id. In so concluding, the court noted that seepages
were not of human-origin and merely "represented evidence that
AMD had at some time in the past entered subsurface waters."
Id. In other words, seepages amounted to "non-point source carri-
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ers of pollutants similar to storm water.., not subject to the Act's
permitting requirements." Id.
Similarly here, any seepage of pollutant-laced rainwater
through soil to groundwater or the Bearclaw River is not of human
origin and is simply evidence that pollutants had at some past
point entered the soil. It is undisputed that PCBs in the river
originated from the soil beneath Appellee's New Union manufac-
turing facility. However, neither that fact alone nor in combina-
tion with a desire to abate the harm stemming from PCBs in the
water makes the ordinary soil under Appellee's facility a convey-
ance within the definition of a point source.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF STATE OF NEW
UNION WATER QUALITY STANDARDS ARE
ACTIONABLE UNDER SECTION 505(a)
CITIZEN SUITS.
The CWA citizen suit provision allows any citizen acting on
his own behalf to commence a civil suit against any person alleged
to be in violation of an effluent standard or limitation. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a)(1) (2005). The CWA clearly envisions citizens exercising
the private right to enforce NPDES permit-based discharge re-
quirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f). Additionally, the structure of
the Act, legislative history and purpose of the CWA show that
Congress intended the private right to extend to suits alleging vio-
lations of state water quality control standards.
A. The Structure and Text of the CWA Indicate that
State Water Quality Standards are a Legitimate
Basis for Citizen Suit.
Citizen suit jurisdiction hinges upon the meaning of "effluent
standard or limitation" under the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
The CWA defines "effluent standard or limitation" by listing condi-
tions including "other limitation under 1311." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(f)(2).
1. "Effluent standard or limitation" is not defined to
exclude water quality standards.
While the specificity of the list hints at exclusivity, the lack of
direct reference to water quality standards in "effluent standard
or limitation" does not exclude water quality standards. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1365(a)(1), (f). Instead, "effluent standard or limitation" should
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be considered suggestive of an obligation that falls within the
Act's broader prohibitions. The Supreme Court advanced this rea-
soning in the context of the savings clause by stating that the ref-
erence to "any effluent standard or limitation" in § 1365(e) was
not restricted to the terms of the CWA itself. Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 16 n.26
(1981). Instead, the Supreme Court opined that Congress in-
tended the phrase be interpreted broadly, encompassing even
state statutory limitations. Id. Thus, an enforceable effluent limi-
tation under the citizen suit provision should not be read to out-
right exclude water quality standards.
2. Water quality standards promulgated under § 1313
are incorporated into "effluent standard or
limitation" by reference to § 1311.
The list of criteria defining "effluent standard or limitation"
need not specifically refer to § 1313-authorized state water quality
standards in order for such standards to be actionable by citizen
suit. See, e.g., PUD #1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep't of Ecol-
ogy, 511 U.S. 700 (1994). In Jefferson County, the Supreme Court
explained that while CWA certification did not specifically author-
ize states to condition certification of federal NPDES permits on
containing state water quality standards, "the statute allows
States to impose limitations to ensure compliance with [§ 1313] of
the Act," and "[§ 1311] ... incorporates [§ 1313] by reference." Id.
at 713. In support, the Supreme Court pointed to "the broad ena-
bling provision in § 1311 that required states to achieve pollution
limitations, including those necessary to meet water quality stan-
dards." Id. at 713 n.3; 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). The Supreme
Court thus concluded that § 1311 "expressly refers to state water
quality standards, and is not limited to discharges." Jefferson
County, 511 U.S. at 713, n.3. Similarly here, reference to § 1311
in "effluent standard or limitation" amounts to a reference to
§ 1313. Therefore, statutory authorization for citizen suits
founded on state water quality standards is afforded.
a. Legislative history substantiates
incorporation of § 1313 by reference to
§ 1311.
Relevant legislative history reveals the same judgment. H.R.
REP.No. 95-830, p. 96 (1977) (Conf. Rep.). Regarded as "under-
stood" that § 1313 "is required by the provisions of [§ 13111," the
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House Conference Report on CWA concluded that "[§ 1313] is al-
ways included by reference where [§ 1311] is listed." Id. (empha-
sis added). As a result, state water quality standards adopted
pursuant to § 1313 are among the violations of § 1311 referenced
in § 1365(f) upon which a citizen may base commencement of a
civil suit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f).
b. Tools of statutory interpretation do not belie
incorporation of § 1313 by reference to
§ 1311.
Moreover, while it is an established principle of statutory in-
terpretation that courts must "construe a statute so that no provi-
sion is rendered inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant,"
reading § 1311 as a reference to § 1313 has no such effect. Asiana
Airlines v. FAA, 134 F.3d 393, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal quo-
tations omitted). Courts do not unbendingly foreclose the possibil-
ity that overlap or duplication exists in statute. See, e.g., Jefferson
County, 511 U.S. 700. In Jefferson County, the Supreme Court
resolved the ambiguity between provisions detailing the scope of
state authority of CWA certification by finding that one was sim-
ply a more specific rendition of the other. Id. at 713-14. The ma-
jority rejected the view that overlapping sections rendered the
more specific provision a "wasted effort" by Congress. Id. at 726
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Instead, the Court explained it as a
manifestation of priority, the satisfaction of which did not pre-
clude other limitations. Id. at 712-13.
Similarly here, it is no surprise that Congress placed great
emphasis on citizen enforcement of point source permit violations.
As a whole, the 1972 Amendments creating the modern CWA sig-
nified an enthusiastic congressional endorsement of national tech-
nology standards for point source dischargers. However, Congress
retained the water quality-based strategy for waters that re-
mained polluted after technology-based standards were applied.
33 U.S.C. § 1313. The emphasis on point source discharge in
§ 1365(f)'s "effluent standard or limitation" merely reflects a shift
in principal focus, not an exclusion of the old regime.
Nor does construing § 1311 as a reference to § 1313 inappro-
priately undermine the limits of citizen suits. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f).
Even generous readings of "effluent standard or limitation" pro-
scribe for example, citizen suits against the EPA Administrator
for failing to enforce water quality standards or other enforcement
action. See, e.g., Allegheny County Sanitary Auth. v. EPA, 732
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F.2d 1167 (3d Cir. 1984) (no citizen suit can be maintained... for
failure to issue orders to stop ongoing pollution). Those limita-
tions are consistent with congressional intent to preserve discre-
tion in the state and federal enforcement prerogative.
c. Caselaw rejecting incorporation of § 1313 by
reference to § 1311 is distinguishable.
Admittedly, courts do not universally hold that § 1311 incor-
porates § 1313 by reference. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. EPA,
333 F.3d 184 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In Friends of the Earth, the court
considered the issue in the context of the scope of jurisdiction for
direct appellate review of EPA action. Id. at 193. Section
1369(b)(1) lists EPA proceedings subject to direct appellate review
and includes decisions pertaining to "effluent limitations or other
limitations" under § 1311. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1). The court de-
clined to conclude that reference to § 1311 meant decisions re-
garding water quality standards promulgated under § 1313 were
entitled to direct appellate review. Friends of the Earth, 333 F.3d
at 193.
However, Friends of the Earth is distinguishable because
courts of appeals "have consistently held that the express listing
of specific EPA actions in [§] 1369(b)(1) precludes direct appellate
review of those actions not so specified." See, e.g., City of Baton
Rouge v. EPA, 620 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Thus, the rule is
clear: the [c]ourts of [a]ppeals have jurisdiction for direct review
only of those EPA actions specifically enumerated in 33 U.S.C.
§ 1369(b)(1)") (emphasis added). No such settled standard as to
the scope and specificity of § 1311 in the context of the citizen suit
provision exists here. 33 U.S.C. § 1365. To the contrary, the Su-
preme Court reasoning in Jefferson County and relevant legisla-
tive history endorse the opposite judgment. 511 U.S. at 713; H.R.
REP.No. 95-830, p. 96 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).
B. Private Enforcement of State Water Quality
Standards Fulfills the Congressional Purpose
Behind CWA Citizen Suit Provision.
The citizen plaintiff serves an important role in CWA enforce-
ment, assuming functions of both independent actor and con-
science of government authority. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (allowing
direct citizen actions against polluters); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (al-
lowing citizens to sue Administrator for failure to perform nondis-
cretionary duties); §§ 1365(b)(1)(A), (B) (making direct citizen
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suits dependent upon notice and a showing that state or federal
enforcers are not diligently prosecuting). In empowering citizen
enforcement, "Congress made clear that citizen groups are not to
be treated as nuisances or troublemakers, but rather as welcomed
participants in the vindication of environmental interests."
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976). In
sum, "these sorts of citizen suits-in which a citizen can obtain an
injunction but cannot obtain money damages for himself-are a
very useful additional tool in enforcing environmental protection
laws." S. REP. No. 92-1236, at 221 (1972) (Remarks of Sen. Bayh).
Citizen suits may make up for inadequate government re-
sources or attention dedicated to enforcement. Here, neither the
federal EPA nor state authorities have commenced an enforce-
ment action against Appellee despite the harm to the resource and
the public. Lack of initiative to address contamination stemming
from Appellee's facility is illustrative of a larger problem of lax
enforcement. See James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Environ-
mental Citizen Suit Trends, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,704, 10,718 (2003) (reporting a 55% drop between 1997 and
2002 in the total number of EPA referrals for civil enforcement of
the CWA).
Now, in a time when non-point source pollution is the "largest
single source of contamination," (Linda A. Malone, The Myths and
Truths That Ended the 2000 TMDL Program, 20 Pace Envtl. L.
Rev. 63, 76 (2002)), it is more important than ever that the goal of
the Act, "to restore and maintain the ... integrity of the Nation's
waters" advances through citizen enforcement of water quality
standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2005). On the 25th Anniversary of
the CWA, Former Vice President Al Gore noted that the push to
safeguard our water resources may have been "formalized by our
laws, but it was carried out by our people." Vice President Albert
Gore, Remarks on the 25th Anniversary of the Clean Water Act
(October 18, 1997) available at http://clinton3.nara.gov/WH/EOP/
OVP/speeches/clean.html. Our people must keep working, un-
hindered by procedural hurdles, to make our waters fishable and
swimmable. 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
III. THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC
NUISANCE IS PROPERLY APPLIED TO THE
INSTANT CASE
Prior to the passage of the CWA, the instant dispute would
have been governed by the common law doctrine of public nui-
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sance. See, e.g., Mo. v. Ill., 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (holding that the
Supreme Court was competent to adjudicate a public nuisance
suit brought by Missouri to enjoin Illinois from discharging sew-
age into the Illinois River). Public nuisance allows relief against
defendants interfering with the interests of the community, where
that interference consists of "more than a slight inconvenience or
petty annoyance." See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 821(f)
(1977). This right is afforded whether or not the entire commu-
nity is affected so long as the nuisance interferes with individuals
who come into contact with it while exercising a public right. Id.
at §821(b). Here, the rights of the citizens of Noblesville who rely
on the Bearclaw River for fishing and recreation are significantly
affected by the presence of dangerous levels of PCBs, which pre-
vents their rightful enjoyment of its waters. See, e.g., N.J. v. New
York City, 283 U.S. 473 (1930) (holding that trash from New York
City that washed up on New Jersey beaches prevented citizens'
enjoyment of swimming and constituted a public nuisance). Ap-
plication of either federal common law or the common law of the
affected state has been disfavored since the passage of the CWA in
1972. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Ill., 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
("Milwaukee I/".) Choice of law, however, is necessarily depen-
dent on the facts particular to a case, and no case with analogous
facts has been considered by the Supreme Court in more than
three decades. Here, the pollution arises from a non-point source
and the laws of the State of Progress do not regulate the efflux of
PCBs from Appellee's property. Thus, this Court is presented
with a novel circumstance that finds precedent not in cases de-
cided since the Act's passage, but in case law set out by the Su-
preme Court that predates the CWA.
A. The Act Provides Comprehensive Regulation of
Pollutants Only When They Originate From Point
Sources.
The Clean Water Act provides comprehensive regulation of
the discharge of pollutants from point sources. 33 U.S.C. § 1311
(2005). The Act does not regulate pollutants arising from broader
or more nebulous sources through the NPDES permit process.
Where water pollution arises from non-point sources, Con-
gress has failed to implement a centralized federal program to
regulate and abate discharges. Instead, 33 U.S.C. § 1329 leaves
the regulation of non-point sources to the discretion of individual
states. (2005). In the absence of federal regulation, there exists
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today no uniform national standard to control the efflux of pollu-
tants from sources such as the soil beneath Appellee's Fort Union
facility.
1. Federal common law is preempted only where the
discharge of pollutants is properly regulated by
the Act.
When Congress enacted the CWA in 1972, it gave no indica-
tion that the statute was intended to pre-empt the federal com-
mon law of nuisance. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(3)(e) provides "Nothing in
this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of
persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek en-
forcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any
other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State
agency)." (2005). It is only subsequent interpretation by the fed-
eral courts that has limited the right to equitable relief under the
federal common law of nuisance. In limiting this right to relief,
however, the Supreme Court has ruled only on point source pollu-
tion. Where the Clean Water Act has been found applicable to the
discharge of pollutants from point sources, it has properly sup-
planted the federal common law of nuisance, which was customa-
rily used by this Court to resolve such disputes. Ill. v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (" Milwaukee I") (allowing Illinois
to sue under the federal common law of nuisance for the discharge
of sewage into Lake Michigan).
In Milwaukee II, the state of Illinois sought an injunction
against Milwaukee and three other Wisconsin cities to abate the
nuisance created by discharging raw sewage from sewer systems
and treatment plants into Lake Michigan. These discharges fell
squarely under the provisions of the Act, "occur[ring] at discrete
discharge points throughout the system." Id. at 309. Further-
more, the cities operated their sewer systems and discharged ef-
fluent under permits issued pursuant to the Act. Id. at 311. In
this circumstance, the Court broke with its tradition of applying
federal common law to interstate water pollution disputes, con-
cluding that "at least so far as concerns the claims of respondents
[Illinois], Congress ... has occupied the field through the estab-
lishment of a comprehensive regulatory program.. ." Id. at 317.
While the Court noted that Congress' intent was to establish an
"all-encompassing" and "comprehensive" program of water pollu-
tion regulation, it also noted that only point sources were subject
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to the Act. Id. at 318 (noting that every point source discharge is
prohibited unless covered by a permit).
Two months later, the Court ratified the rejection of federal
common law where it is pre-empted by the Act in Middlesex
County Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
Respondents brought suit under the Act against various federal,
state, and local officials for discharging pollutants in amounts not
permitted by the Act and under the Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act for permitting vessels to dump pollutants
into coastal waters. Respondents alleged that sewage and other
waste materials being discharged by certain of the petitioners
were harming Atlantic fisheries. Id. at 4-5. As in Milwaukee H,
sewage systems were in issue. Although the court below noted "it
is not entirely clear that the complaint in Sea Clammers was con-
fined to point source pollution" it is clear that the source of allegdd
pollution, sewage systems, are point sources as defined by 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14) and as interpreted by the Court in Milwaukee
I. (R. at 8.) Moreover, the Court's discussion of the Act's restric-
tions on "discharges of pollutants," defined by the Act as "any ad-
dition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,"
indicates that in deciding the case the Court considered the origin
of the effluent to be point sources, whether or not all of the alleged
pollution actually came from such sources. Sea Clammers, 453
U.S. at 11; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2005).
Though the Court found the federal common law of nuisance
preempted under those circumstances, courts have preserved com-
mon law remedies when no irreconcilable conflict between statu-
tory scheme and common law remedies exists. See, e.g., Nader v.
Alleghany Airlines, 426 U.S. 290, 299 (1978). Because no irrecon-
cilable conflict arises when applying federal common law to the
circumstances here, federal common law is properly applied.
2. The federal common law of nuisance is not
preempted because the CWA does not regulate
efflux from Appellee's Fort Union facility.
In determining whether federal common law has been dis-
placed by federal statute, courts assess the scope of the legislation
and whether the congressional scheme addresses the issue once
governed by federal common law. Milwaukee H, 451 U.S. at 315
n.8. Inasmuch as the Act regulates discharge of pollutants only
from point sources and the soil beneath Appellee's facility is not a
point source, the Act does not provide a basis on which to adjudi-
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cate the present dispute. Instead, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) delegates
the regulation of "water quality" to individual states, effectively
leaving the regulation of non-point source solution to fifty sepa-
rate agencies. (2005).
B. Federal Common Law Is Properly Applied Because It
Furthers the National Interest in Clean Waterways.
Appellees have polluted the soil beneath their Fort Union fa-
cility with PCBs, which are entering the Bear Claw River and de-
grading the quality of life of the citizens of Noblesville. Appellee's
pollution of the Bearclaw River is contrary to the Act's goal "to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integ-
rity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2005). Although
the Act has effectively confronted point source pollution, many riv-
ers are still too polluted for fishing and swimming, largely because
of non-point source pollution. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Clean Water Action Plan (Feb. 19, 1998), available at http://www.
epa.gov/history/topics/cwa/03.htm. Typically, federal common law
is applied to programs which by their nature must be uniform in
character throughout the Nation. United States v. Yazell, 382
U.S. 341, 354 (1966). The problem of interstate pollution, exem-
plified by the instant case, and Congress' expressed intent by cre-
ating a national regulatory program to deal with point source
pollution demonstrates a pressing need for a common body of law
to resolve non-point source disputes. Absent a common body of
law to resolve disputes between the fifty States, each potentially
with its own regulatory scheme for non-point sources, achieving
meaningful national regulation of water quality standards will be
impossible.
C. Federal Common Law Is Properly Applied Because
There Is a Significant Conflict Between the Goals
of the Act and the Laws of the State of Progress.
The Act's goals of restoring and maintaining the integrity of
the nation's waters cannot reasonably be met where non-point
source pollution continues to degrade the quality of the nations'
navigable waters. (See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra). Al-
though the Act does not directly regulate non-point source pollu-
tion, it does set guidelines states must respect when crafting their
own enforcement schemes. 33 U.S.C. §1313(c) (2005). The State
of Progress is charged with establishing water quality standards
in line with federal guidelines with respect to certain toxic chemi-
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cals, including PCBs, set out in 33 U.S.C. §1317(a)(1), regardless
of their source. (2005). Under federal guidelines, the ambient
water criterion for PCBs in navigable waters is .001 microgram
per liter. 40 C.F.R. §129. The State of New Union has set stan-
dards for the Bearclaw River adjacent to Noblesville in line with
this requirement.
An initial bar to the application of federal common law is the
need to demonstrate a significant conflict between federal policy
and the use of state law. Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384
U.S. 63, 68 (1966). In the instant case, federal policy limits the
concentration of PCBs allowed in navigable waters, yet the State
of Progress has established no limitations on PCBs in the Class C
waters immediately upstream from its border with the State of
New Union. As a result, PCBs that have entered the river from
Defendant's facility have accumulated near Noblesville and have
rendered the fish in that habitat unsafe to eat under FDA
guidelines.
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) requires states to identify and prioritize
bodies of water where the direct regulation of points sources by
the Act are insufficient to meet water quality standards. Non-
point sources are not subject to a federal permitting program and
therefore non-point source reductions could be enforced against a
polluter only to the extent that the state institutes regulatory re-
quirements. Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1355-56
(N.D. Cal. 2000), afld sub nom Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123
(9th Cir. 2000). By not providing for a comprehensive regulatory
scheme for non-point sources comparable to that promulgated for
point source pollution under the Act, Congress has not created a
uniform body of national law and has not pre-empted the applica-
tion of federal common law to disputes like the one before this
court. Where, as here, state law is in direct conflict with national
policy, federal common law is properly applied to resolve the issue
at bar.
D. The Federal Common Law of Nuisance Is Properly
Applied Because the State of New Union Has No
Other Adequate Legal Remedy.
In the absence of effective state regulation governing the dis-
charge of PCBs into the Bearclaw River, Defendant will continue
to frustrate the intent of the Act and harm the citizens of the State
of New Union. It is the public that is effectively held hostage by
the State of Progress' unwillingness to enforce water quality stan-
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dards. Equitable relief under the public law of nuisance is neces-
sary where a plaintiff has no other adequate statutory remedy.
Tex. v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971). Where, as
here, no remedy exists, given the lack of standards for PCBs in its
Class C waters, federal common law is properly applied to abate
the clear and present hazard to the health of the citizens of the
State of New Union.
Because the Act does not directly regulate non-point source
pollution, it does not preempt the federal common law of nuisance
that the federal courts have applied for most of the last century.
The demonstration of congressional intent to eliminate pollution
in the nation's waterways should not thwart the implementation
of that will by this court. Application of federal common law will
further the goals of the Act, provide a fair standard to adjudicate
the conflict between the national policy limiting PCB efflux and
the inadequate laws of the State of Progress, and afford the State
of New Union with an adequate legal remedy.
E. Alternatively, State Common Law Can Be Employed
to Enjoin Appellee's Further Pollution of the
Bearclaw River.
If the court will not apply federal common law to the case at
bar, state common law still governs the pollution of New Union's
waters. In International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the Supreme
Court ruled that citizens of Vermont were entitled to use New
York's common law of nuisance, even in light of CWA passage,
against a polluter impacting water quality across the state line.
479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987). In that case, a paper mill located on the
New York shore of Lake Champlain discharged pollutants from a
diffusion pipe (a point source), allegedly causing significant degra-
dation to the lake's waters across the state line in Vermont. Id. at
484.
Traditional choice-of-law rules may have allowed the Ver-
mont property owners to apply their state's common law under the
"law of the place of wrong rule" to the damages incurred in Ver-
mont. The Oullette Court noted factors that called instead for ap-
plication of the source state's law in the wake of the Act's passage.
479 U.S. at 495. Importantly, finding a New York source liable
under Vermont law would effectuate an override of New York per-
mit requirements and legislative policy choices. Id. New York
might then be compelled to adopt different standards from those
approved by the EPA, even though Vermont had not similarly
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weighed the costs and benefits, undermining the efficiency and
predictability of the permit system. Id. at 496.
The Court also noted that the Act defines the roles of both the
source and affected states, providing through the NPDES permit-
ting process a chance for their interests to be considered and bal-
anced by the EPA. Id. at 497. This reasoning was echoed in
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 99 (1992), where Oklahoma
sought to enjoin Arkansas from building and operating a sewage
treatment plant that would discharge waste into the Illinois
River. There, the Court noted that Congress had addressed the
concerns of downstream states by providing an opportunity for
hearings, requiring the upstream state to explain its failure to ac-
cept recommendations of the downstream state, and by authoriz-
ing the EPA to veto the issuance of a permit.
1. Economic and permitting considerations that
have called for applying the source state's
common law are not present in the case at
bar.
Neither the economic nor permitting considerations that
called for the application of New York common law in Oullette op-
erate in the instant case. Whereas the application of Vermont's
common law was held to frustrate the efficiency and predictability
of the Act's operation in Oullette, here this court is presented with
the converse problem. Application of the State of Progress' com-
mon law to the instant dispute will frustrate the intent of the Act
and undermine the purpose of the regulatory framework it pro-
vides for point source discharges.
Application of New Union's law will not frustrate the Act's
regulatory framework by applying stricter standards than those
mandated by Congress and the EPA. To the extent that PCBs
have accumulated in fish and sediments downstream of Appellee's
facility at concentrations not merely inconvenient but hazardous
to human health, Appellee's efflux is quite clearly beyond the min-
imal acceptable levels envisioned by Congress.
Further, there are no interests to be closely balanced; Con-
gress has clearly expressed the intent to tightly control PCBs by
setting a very low permissible ambient concentration and by ban-
ning their use outright. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (2005). Unlike the
economic benefit derived from the paper mill in Oullette or the
construction and operation of the sewage treatment plant in Ar-
kansas, no public good accrues to the citizens of the State of Pro-
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gress by failing to eliminate toxic chemicals leaching from
Appellee's property into the Bearclaw River. Requiring Appellee's
to cease this efflux will neither impose costs on the State of Pro-
gress nor require Appellee to cease production at its Fort Union
facility, since the pollution presumably arises not from present ac-
tivity but from activity that ceased twenty-five years ago.
Nor can there be an adverse effect on the permitting process
where, as here, no permit has been issued. Unlike the down-
stream states in Milwaukee I and Arkansas, the State of New
Union had no opportunity to voice concerns to the EPA, and the
EPA was not presented with the opportunity to bar Appellee's dis-
charge. Because neither the remedies provided by the CWA nor
the common law of the State of Progress are likely to afford relief
to the citizens of Noblesville, the laws of the State of New Union
should be applied to the case at bar.
2. Choice of law standards favor the application of
the common law of the State of New Union.
With the concerns expressed by the Court in Oullette and Ar-
kansas allayed, there is ample precedent to support the use of the
State of New Union's laws to Appellee's pollution. Although the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV § 1, and the Due
Process Clause, U.S. Const. amend XIV § 1, of the Constitution
protect a citizen of one state from being subject to the laws of an-
other, Appellee can nevertheless be liable under the laws of New
Union. Under International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), Ap-
pellee is subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts of New Union
because by polluting the Bearclaw River and beaches adjacent to
Noblesville, it has demonstrated "minimum contacts... such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."' Because Appellee is a private
party, the sovereignty of the State of Progress is only incidentally
implicated by applying the laws of New Union to Appellee's activi-
ties in Fort Union. To that extent, however, neither the Full Faith
and Credit Clause nor the Due Process Clause will shield Appellee
in the instant case.
The Supreme Court addressed choice of law in Allstate Insur-
ance Company v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (holding that Minne-
sota law was correctly applied to an insurance policy issued in
Wisconsin where the accident invoking the policy occurred in Min-
nesota), the laws of New Union are properly applied to Appellee's
activities in Fort Union. Under Allstate, a state wishing to apply
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its own laws to an out-of-state actor must demonstrate a "state
interest" in applying its own laws. Id. at 308. It must also demon-
strate that the refusal to apply the law of the other interested
state does not threaten its sovereignty and show that the choice of
law is not totally arbitrary or unfair to either litigant. Id. at 323,
326 (Stevens, J., concurring). New Union has a manifest state in-
terest in protecting the quality of its waters and the health of its
citizens. The application of New Union's laws is not a threat to
the sovereignty of the State of Progress because in the instant dis-
pute the State of Progress has failed to bring its laws into compli-
ance with national standards and thus has abdicated its authority
to enforce PCB limitations. Finally, it is the application of the
State of Progress' law, not New Union's, which would effect an ar-
bitrary, unfair result by allowing inadequate state laws out of out
of compliance with national standards to hide behind the sup-
posed preemption granted by the CWA.
Here, the facts are distinguishable from those previously con-
sidered by federal courts. Because the concerns about applying
the common law of the effected state noted by the Supreme Court
in Oullette and Arkansas do not apply here, and because absent
these concerns the choice of law doctrine favors application of the
laws of the affected state, if it elects to adjudicate under the state
law of nuisance, this court should apply the common law of the
State of New Union.
IV. BRK MAY NOT MAINTAIN A PUBLIC
NUISANCE CLAIM ON BEHALF OF ITS
MEMBERS UNDER THE "SPECIAL INJURY"
RULE BECAUSE ITS INJURY IS NOT
DIFFERENT IN KIND FROM THAT SUFFERED
BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC.
Under federal common law, a government plaintiff, as the
sovereign representative for the people, may bring a public nui-
sance action for the interference with public rights such as health,
welfare, and comfort. Phila. Elec. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303,
315 (3d Cir. 1985). In limited circumstances, a private party may
also bring a public nuisance action for interference with such pub-
lic rights. Id. This uniquely powerful tort is limited however, by
the requirement that this private party show some recognized
type of special, particular, or peculiar injury. Bowe v. Scott, 233
U.S. 658, 651 (1914). Under this special injury rule, a "private
litigant cannot recover damages for a public nuisance unless he or
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she can show a special injury different in kind from that suffered
by the general public." Oppen v. Aetna Ins., 485 F.2d 252, 259 (9th
Cir. 1973) (emphasis added). Applying this rule here, the injury
suffered by the members of BRK, the curtailment of recreation
and fishing, is the exact same kind of injury suffered by all mem-
bers of the Noblesville community. Although the injury to the
members of BRK may have been more severe in degree than that
suffered by the general public, the basic nature of the injury re-
mains the same. Thus, BRK fails to establish any special injury
beyond that to public rights held by all members of the Noblesville
community. Accordingly, BRK may not maintain a public nui-
sance claim on behalf of its members.
A. The Injury to the Public Rights of Fishing and
Recreation that BRK's Members Allege Differs at
Most Only in Degree From that Suffered by the
General Public.
The injuries asserted by BRK here are similar to those set
forth by a class of Alaska Natives in the wake of the 1989 ground-
ing of the Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound, Alaska that re-
sulted in a massive oil spill. Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp.,
104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997). There, a class of 3,455 individual
Alaska Natives alleged injury to their "subsistence way of life,
archaeological sites and artifacts.. . natural resources and prop-
erty upon which [they] depend and/or which are part of their natu-
ral habitat and lives." Id. at 1197. While the Ninth Circuit
recognized that the oil spill may very well have had a more detri-
mental effect upon the subsistence and communal life of Alaska
Natives than other Alaskans, the court nevertheless held that the
"right to lead subsistence lifestyles is not limited to Alaska Na-
tives" and the harmed public rights of fishing and recreation were
shared by all Alaskans. Id. at 1198. Accordingly, the Alaska Na-
tives failed to allege an injury to their class that was different in
kind from that suffered by all Alaskans, and subsequently failed
to establish standing as a private party to bring a public nuisance
action.
Similarly, when the Alaska Sportfishing Association brought
a public nuisance action against Exxon, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the dismissal of that action. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass'n v.
Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 1994). The court reasoned that
the sportfishers had failed to allege an injury beyond that common
to the general public. Id. at 771. Fishing, recreation, and the ba-
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sic enjoyment of natural resources are rights shared by the gen-
eral public. Although the sportfishers arguably exercised these
rights more frequently and were thus harmed more severely, the
injury remained the same in kind.
Notably, in dismissing both the sportfishers' and Alaska Na-
tives' claims, the Ninth Circuit explained that private party
standing for a public nuisance action can be established upon a
showing of economic damage suffered as a result of the public nui-
sance. By failing to assert that the oil spill had somehow caused
damage to their boats or equipment, however, the sportsfishers'
claim failed to fit within this narrow exception. Alaska Sport
Fishing Ass'n., 34 F.3d at 772. By contrast, certain Alaska Na-
tives who alleged economic damage to the commercial value of
their fish harvest were found to have standing within the excep-
tion, and thus able to pursue compensation under their public nui-
sance action. Alaska Native Class, 104 F.3d at 1197-98. However,
the bulk of the class, in the absence of economic damages and hav-
ing suffered an injury that differed only in degree from the aver-
age Alaskan, was unable to "prove any 'special injury' to support a
public nuisance action." Id. at 1198.
Here, BRK and its members assert no direct economic dam-
ages in the wake of the Bearclaw River contamination. Unlike the
Alaska Natives whose commercial interests were damaged by the
loss of fishing resources, none of BRK's members claim to have a
stake in the commercial harvest of fish or to have suffered direct
economic damages. Instead, BRK attempts to invoke the sweep-
ing tenets of "environmental justice" in framing its right to main-
tain a public nuisance action. This argument is unpersuasive.
BRK does not produce any evidence that would indicate in-
jury of a special, distinct, or even heightened nature from that suf-
fered by the entire Noblesville community. Instead, BRK asserts
that the injuries to its members are necessarily different based
merely on economic-disadvantage and classification as an ethnic
minority. BRK bears the burden to allege and show special injury
in this private party public nuisance action. Lower Commerce Ins.
v. Halliday, 636 So. 2d 430, 431 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994). BRK has
failed to meet this burden.
First, even if BRK's members were indeed more vulnerable
than the general public, the injury suffered would only differ in
degree or severity, not in general kind. BRK does not allege any
injury beyond that to public rights, which are not limited to its
members or the Proto-litigian minority in Noblesville. Second, it
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is not evident that BRK's members actually represent a distinct
minority within the general community. The record does not indi-
cate that they are necessarily any more vulnerable than the aver-
age Noblesville resident. Instead, the record reveals that eighty
percent of Noblesville's population is also Proto-litigian, and that
on average the population is just above the poverty line. Accord-
ingly, it is difficult to rationalize how BRK's claims of "environ-
mental justice" set in this context can somehow establish an
injury that is sufficiently different from that suffered by the gen-
eral public.
B. Mere Differences in Degree of Injury Do Not Confer
Standing for a Public Nuisance Claim to Private
Individuals.
The well-established special injury rule and its component
"difference in kind" test have been followed by virtually all state
and federal courts. The lone exception to this widespread endorse-
ment is the state of Hawaii. In Akau v. Olohana Corporation, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected the "difference in kind" rule
when considering a public nuisance action brought by private in-
dividuals asserting public rights to access ancient beach trails. 65
Haw. 383 (Haw. 1982). The court found that traditional ratio-
nales for the "difference in kind" test were not implicated and
choose instead to follow an American Law Institute's Restatement
(Second) of Torts provision that allowed private citizens to sue as
representatives of the general public or as members of a class. Id.
at 387. Importantly, this decision to abandon the traditional spe-
cial injury rule and adopt the Restatement is limited to a minority
of one state court.
Instead, nearly all jurisdictions maintain the strict "difference
in kind" rule under its tripartite rationale. Under the first of
these traditional rationales, the difference in kind requirement
preserves the role of the sovereign to enforce the law. Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 198
(2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Second, the rule prevents a multi-
plicity of actions and potentially endless litigation by individuals
possessed of the same interests. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Save Sand
Key, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9, 12 (Fla. 1974). Third, the rule aims to
preclude actions that are minor, petty and trivial so far as the in-
dividual is concerned. Notably, as a matter of pure judicial conve-
nience, the strict "difference in kind" test also relieves the courts
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of the daunting task of somehow setting a dividing line in deter-
mining at which point differences in degree become actionable.
C. Noblesville, as the Duly Appointed Local
Governmental Authority, Is the Appropriate Party
to Bring a Public Nuisance Action on Behalf of
the Injury Suffered by its Constituents.
Applying the tripartite rationale here, it is apparent that a
departure from the traditional "difference in kind" special injury
rule could easily result in countless, individual private parties
pursuing virtually identical public nuisance claims. These claims
would litigate a seemingly trivial matter to the individual, twelve
pounds of fish annually and the right to swim at the public beach.
Instead, collectively these injuries prove to be much more signifi-
cant and should be pursued by the Town of Noblesville. As the
local government authority, Noblesville has standing to sue under
a public nuisance action without showing special injury. See Cox
v. New Castle County, 265 A.2d 26 (Del. 1970). Nothing in the
record indicates that Noblesville's interest in protecting the local
environment and the public rights of its residents differs from the
interests of BRK. Noblesville has already shown its desire to pro-
tect these interests by filing a public nuisance action. Addition-
ally, Major Electronics has not challenged Noblesville's status as
the proper plaintiff in this action. Accordingly, Noblesville is the
appropriate party to bring a public nuisance action on behalf of
the injury suffered by all of its constituents.
V. ALTHOUGH BRK AND NOBLESVILLE APPEAR
TO BE PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING
CLAIMS FOR CONTRIBUTION AGAINST
APPELLEE UNDER CERCLA § 113(f),
BOTH MAY MAINTAIN CLAIMS UNDER CERCLA
§ 107 FOR THE RECOVERY OF RESPONSE
COSTS.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act ("CERCLA") provides for a right to cost recovery
in certain circumstances, and separate rights to contribution in
other circumstances. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 - 9675 (2005). Here,
these two liability provisions could be applicable as BRK and
Noblesville seek reimbursement or contribution for their response
costs to the release of hazardous substances from Major Electron-
ics' facility. Although both BRK and Noblesville appear to be pre-
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cluded from bringing an action under CERCLA § 113(f), both
parties have viable claims under § 107.
A. In the Absence of a Pending or Previous Action
Under CERCLA §§ 106 or 107, BRK and Noblesville
Do Not Have Claims Under CERCLA § 113(f) for
Contribution.
CERCLA § 113(f), as an action for contribution, exists for the
express purpose of allocating fault among potentially responsible
parties ("PRPs"). Rumpke of Indiana v. Cummins Engine Co., 107
F.3d 1235 (7th Cir. 1997). The action allows parties to "seek con-
tribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable
under [§J 107(a)." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2005). Accordingly, by its
own terms, § 113(f) precludes wholly innocent parties from bring-
ing a contribution action to recover response costs. Instead, inno-
cent parties are able to file suit for full recovery of their costs
under CERCLA § 107(a). Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416
(2d Cir. 1998). Here, BRK and Noblesville plainly do not fit
within the scope of PRPs as set forth by § 107(a). Neither party is
the current or past owner of a vessel or facility that has released a
hazardous substance, nor can either be described as an arranger
of disposal or as a transporter of any hazardous substances. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2005). Accordingly, any claims for recovery costs
by BRK and Noblesville are more properly framed under § 107.
Even if BRK and Noblesville were somehow characterized as
PRPs, an action under § 113() would still be unavailable to them.
Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Cooper Industries v. Avi-
all Services, a party who has not been sued under CERCLA §§ 106
or 107(a) may not obtain contribution under § 113(f) from other
liable parties. 125 S. Ct. 577, 580 (2004). Despite the seemingly
permissive statutory language, that "any person may seek contri-
bution" from other liable parties during or following an action
under §§ 106 or 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (emphasis added), the
Court maintained that as a matter of statutory construction a
pending or previous action under §§ 106 or 107 is a prerequisite
for a § 113() claim. Aviall, 125 S. Ct. at 583. Here, there is no
indication that either BRK or Noblesville have been or currently
are the target of a claim under §§ 106 or 107. As such, under Avi-
all, neither BRK nor Noblesville may bring a claim under § 113(f).
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B. Although Noblesville Does Not Fit Within the
Statutory Construction of a PRP, Even If It Were
Characterized as a PRP as the Owner of the
Contaminated Beach, Noblesville Would Still
Be Entitled to Maintain a Claim Under CERCLA § 107
Under the Implied Right to Contribution.
As a preliminary matter, it bears repeating that Noblesville
cannot be characterized as a PRP under the framework set forth
by CERCLA § 107(a). That section imposes liability on four clas-
ses of PRPs: (1) current owners and operators of contaminated fa-
cilities; (2) previous owners and operators of such facilities; (3)
generators of hazardous substances; and (4) transporters of haz-
ardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Here, as the current holder
in public trust of the contaminated beach, Noblesville does not fall
within any of these classes. To hold Noblesville and its taxpayers
liable for the release of hazardous substances from Major Elec-
tronics' facility would plainly be contrary to the broad remedial
purpose of CERCLA to shift the costs of environmental response
to parties who benefited from wastes that caused harm. OHM
Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578
(5th Cir. 1997).
Even if Noblesville were classified as a PRP, the town would
still have a viable claim under § 107 for the implied right of contri-
bution. In Key Tronic Corporation v. United States, the Supreme
Court recognized that § 107 "unquestionably provides a cause of
action for [PRPs] to seek recovery of cleanup costs" even though
"that cause of action is not explicitly set out in the text of the stat-
ute." 511 U.S. 809, 818 (1994). With the enactment of § 113(f),
Congress unequivocally stated that the express right of contribu-
tion under CERCLA was not to "diminish the right of any person
to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action
under [§] 106 or [§1 107." 42 U.S.C. 9613(f). As the dissent inAvi-
all opined, this savings clause preserves "all preexisting state and
federal rights of action for contribution, including the § 107 im-
plied right this Court recognized in Key Tronic." 125 S. Ct. at 588
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Although the majority in Aviall declined to consider the via-
bility of a freestanding § 107 claim for the implied right of contri-
bution, Aviall's assertion of a single, joint §§ 107 and 113(f) claim
pursuant to § 113(f) did not provoke a denunciation of that possi-
bility from the Court. 125 S. Ct. at 585. Instead, the right contin-
ues to garner acceptance. See Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of
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Greater Chi. v. Lake River Corp., 365 F. Supp. 2d 913, 918 (N.D.
Ill. 2005) (recognizing implied right of contribution in light of
broad coverage of § 107(a) and savings clause of § 113(f)(1)). Ac-
cordingly, if Noblesville was classified as a PRP and thus pre-
cluded from bringing a contribution action under § 113(f) in the
absence of a pending or previous action under §§ 106 or 107,
Noblesville would still be able to bring an action for the implied
right of contribution under § 107. To preclude recovery for such
response costs incurred voluntarily by a PRP would directly con-
travene CERCLA's general purpose of promoting the prompt and
proper cleanup of contaminated properties. Metro. Water, 365 F.
Supp. 2d at 918.
C. BRK's Claim Under § 107 Cannot Be Denied as
Inconsistent With the National Contingency Plan
Because Whether a Response Action Is Necessary
and Consistent With the Criteria Set Forth in
the Plan Is a Factual Question to be Determined at
the Damages Stage of a § 107(a) Action, Not at the
Liability Stage.
A determination of whether a response action is necessary
and consistent with criteria set forth in the National Contingency
Plan is a "factual one to be determined at the damages stage of a
section 107(a) action." Cadillac Fairview v. Dow Chem., 840 F.2d
691, 695 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, alleged inconsistencies are "not a
basis for granting summary judgment." Mid Valley Bank v. No.
Valley Bank, 764 F. Supp. 1377, 1390 (E.D. Cal. 1991). Instead,
noncompliance is better explored at trial, where both parties have
an opportunity to substantiate whether response costs were un-
necessary or inconsistent with the Plan. Cadillac, 840 F.2d at
695. Here, BRK's claim under § 107 was improperly denied at the
liability stage of the action. The district court summarily and er-
roneously denied BRK's claim without any explanation of how its
claim for response costs differed from the Plan. BRK's § 107 claim
should proceed, as its response costs appear to have been "neces-
sary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health
or welfare . . .which may otherwise result from a release." 42
U.S.C. § 9601(23) (2005).
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Noblesville respectfully re-
quests this court affirm the lower court's summary judgment find-
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ings to the extent that ordinary soil is not a point source and
BRK's public nuisance claim under the "special injury" rule fails.
Noblesville also urges that this court find a private right of action
to enforce water quality standards, apply federal or state common
law of nuisance and validate Noblesville's claim for CERCLA
reimbursement.
Respectfully Submitted
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